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EDITORIAL NOTES
AFFIDAVITS AND NOTICE UNDER OHIO MECHANICS'
LIEN STATUTE

Recent cases under the Ohio Mechanics' Lien Statute have
tended to emphasize the existing confusion in the perfecting of
mechanics' liens and the need for statutory revision.
Several cases involved the construction of the language in
Ohio General Code, section 8310, providing for a lien to those
furnishing work, labor or material "by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with the owner, part owner, or lessee, of any
interest in real estate or the authorized agent of the owner, part
owner, or lessee of any interest in real estate . . ." In one of
the cases, the Becker Plumbing Supply Company v. Rialto
Improvement Company,' it was alleged that certain materials
were delivered to a building owned by the Rialto Improvement
Company. The petition recited that the materials were delivered at the request of one Reimer. The court stated, "There
was no contract between Reimer and the Rialto Improvement
Company, and an allegation of this nature, we think, would be
Further elucidanecessary under section 8310, General Code."
tion of the position of Reimer does not appear in the opinion.
It is submitted, however, that unless Reimer was a complete
136 Ohio App. 102, 172 N. E. 700 (1930).
507

508

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

volunteer, it is difficult, in view of the broad language of section
8310, to support a holding that the lien is invalid because of a
lack of such contract as is required by the statute.
In the case of Lewin Lumber Company v. Gutman,2 after a
purchaser had taken possession of a newly constructed building,
she requested the contractor to do certain work not called for in
the original contract, to-wit: the furnishing of two drawers for
breakfast nook tables and of frames and trims for window openings for ventilation of the kitchen. The plaintiff, who had
previously supplied the millwork for the building, supplied the
needed additional material and later filed a lien for both the
millwork and the extras ordered after possession by the purchaser. The lien was filed within sixty days after the extras,
but more than sixty days after the furnishing of the last of the
materials previous to the extras. The court held that the extras
under the circumstances constituted a separate contract and that
the lien only could apply to materials for such extras and not
embrace the material previously furnished.
In the Becker Plumbing Supply Company case, supra, there
also was involved the question of what constitutes proper notice
of the filing of a lien under section 8315. The lien claimant
alleged that not knowing the address of the owner it posted a
copy of the lien upon the premises. The notice apparently was
directed to the Rialto Improvement Company, the owner at the
time when construction was commenced. Actually, at the time
of the alleged posting of the notice, parties named MacNeffs
were the owners, and in possession. The court denied the
validity of the lien on the grounds that no valid notice was given
under section 8315, providing for the service of a copy of the affi234 Ohio App. 458, 171 N.

E. 342 (1929); Gill v. Konvisser, 32 Ohio C. A.

542 (1914).
The cases of Garrett v. Lishawa, 36 Ohio App. 129, 172 N. E. 845 (1930),
and Bohunek v. Smith, 36 Ohio App. 146, 172 N. E. 852 (1930), involve questions analagous to that of the Lewis Lumber Company case. In both the
Garrett and Bohunek cases, the court refused to permit minor work, done
after the completion of the main work, to be considered as part of the original
contract and thus extend the time for filing of liens, even though the additions
were performed in the one case to make good on a warranty of the original
construction, and in the second case to remedy a defect in the original construction. The rule of these cases is sound, and should tend to amelioral.
some of the abuses under the present statute.
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davit upon the owner or his agent or lessee within thirty days
after the filing with the recorder.
Apparently the court doubted the truth of the allegation that
a copy of the notice of the filing of the lien was posted on the
building. The decision, however, is not put on the basis of the
lack of proof of this allegation, but on the ground that the notice
should have been served upon the MacNeffs. The court said,
"The MacNeffs were innocent purchasers of the property in
question. It appears that they exercised due care in the purchase of the property, and no blame can attach to them because
of the lack of necessary service." Previous cases have held that
notice upon the party who was the owner at the time construction was commenced, is sufficient, even though the purchaser is
in possession at the time of the filing of the lien, and the service of
notice.' The point has not been passed on by the supreme court.
In the case of Schuholz v. Walker,4 the notice of the filing of
mechanic's lien was served upon the purchaser in possession, who
was not the owner at the time that the contract was entered into.
The supreme court held that the service of notice upon such
purchaser was sufficient, refusing to express any opinion as to
whether notice to the prior owner also would have been sufficient.
In the case of Frish v. Amon,' a lien claimant, a plumber,
prior to filing his lien affidavit, furnished the owner with his own
affidavit under section 8312, in which he stated, under the title
"Material", "All material taken out of stock." The evidence
showed that some material was not taken from the plumber's
stock, but that it had been paid for prior to the filing of the
affidavit. The court held that the lien was invalid, because the
names and certificates of materialmen, as required by section
•8312, had not been given. This decision was in accordance with
that of the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of the Mahoning
Park Company v. Warren Home Development Company. 6
Despite the fact that by its terms the mechanics' lien statute
requires a liberal construction to be given to its provisions, 7
3

Fisher v. Jacobs, 24 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 505 (1920); Harriman National Bank
v. North Shaker Boulevard Co., 25 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 263, 280 (1924).
'1 11 Ohio St. 308, 145 N. E. 537 (1924).
b3 4 Ohio App. 447, 171 N. E. 247 (1929).
'109 Ohio St. 358, 370, 142 N. E. 883 (1924).
7

Ohio Gcn. Code, sec. 8323-8.
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the cases show the many difficulties encountered in the attempts
to obtain and enforce liens.
Most frequently when a mechanic's lien is litigated, the contractor has been paid by the owner, and either has become insolvent or has absconded, without paying his sub-contractors and
materialmen. The fact of non-payment cannot be determined
from the recorder's records prior to the filing of the lien affidavit,
except in the case of registered land. The feeling has been growing in Ohio that owners, purchasers and others, should be able
to rely upon the records in regard to mechanics' liens, as well as
other title matters, and that the prospective lien claimant should
be required to place on record his intention to file a lien.
As was inevitable, the sentiment that the present statute is
unfair, has been reflected in the decisions of the courts, denying
the enforcement of liens in hard cases, and frequently resolving
ambiguities against the lien. Under the circumstances, mechanics, contractors and materialmen, as well as owners, purchasers
and lenders are prejudiced.
It is submitted that the need is great for a revision of the
mechanics' lien statute to reduce the procedural doubts and make
it possible for purchasers and others interested in land to rely
upon the official records.
JAMES L. MAGRISH.

AUTOMOBILES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGE NCE OF PASSENGERRAILROAD CROSSINGS

The question of contributory negligence of a guest in a private
automobile, where the guest has been injured by the negligence
of the driver or of a third person, has been involved in several
recent decisions of the Ohio courts.
In Hockinig V11cy Ry. v. Wykle, l the plaintiff was riding on
the right side of the front seat of an automobile which was struck
by a train of the defendant. There were obstructions to the
view on both sides of the highway at the crossing, the right side
being obstructed more than the left. The train came from the
left. The driver listened as he approached the crossing, and
when within a few feet slowed his machine to from five to ten
miles an hour. The plaintiff looked particularly to the right
1122 Ohio St. 3o. 171 N. E. 860 (193o).
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and as he turned and looked to the left, saw a glare, the automobile being struck the next instant. Special charges requested by
the defendant, defining the plaintiff's duty of care, were refused.'
The court said:
"The question is thus presented as to the duty of a guest in
an automobile under the circumstances disclosed by the record,
and the instruction that should be given the jury in that regard.
While the authorities differ somewhat in the statement of the
rule governing the conduct of passengers or guests in an automobile and prescribing their duties, all are in accord that the
guest in an automobile is not entirely relieved from obligation to
exercise care for his own safety. Clearly it is his duty to exercise
that care which persons of ordinary care and prudence are accustomed to exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
Hence, while one riding as a guest in an automobile is not charged
with the duty of being on the lookout for possible dangers, such
as devolves upon the driver of the automobile, yet it is his duty
to exercise his senses of sight and hearing as would a person of
ordinary care and prudence under the same or similar circumstances to observe the approach of a train and apprise the driver
thereof. The conduct of the guest to come within the requirement of ordinary care would differ somewhat under varying
-circumstances. In that respect the court should not go further
in instructing-the jury than was indicated in Toledo Rys. & Light
Co. v. Mayers, 93 Ohio St., 304, 112 N. E. 1014, and Board of.
Commrs. of Logan
County v. Bicher, Admx., 98 Ohio St. 432,
'
121 N. E. 535.

1

The court quoted with approval the rule set out in Smith v.
4
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
2"It

was the duty of the plaintiff, riding in the Ford automobile to use

ordinary care in the exercise of his own faculties in looking and listening for a
train as the automobile al)proached the crossing, and such looking and listening
should have been at such time and place and in such manner as would be
effective to accomplish the ends designed thereby."
"It was the plaintiff's duty to use his senses of sight and hearing to avoid
injury to himself when he was about to go upon the grade crossing, which is
admittedly a place of danger. The time to use these senses for his own protection was just before going into the zone of danger, and it was the plaintiff's
ditty to look and listen in such a manner as would make the use of these senses
effective."
1122 Ohio St. 395, 171 N. H. 860 (1930).
49 S. W. (2d) 939), 946 (Mo,, 1928): "While the law requires a guest in an
automobile to exercise ordinary care and prudence for his own safety, and does
not permit him to intrust his safety absolutely to the driver, regardless of
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. In Myers, Admr., v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,5 it was held that
no inference of negligence of the decedent was raised by allegations of a petition that the decedent was accustomed to ride
home from his work on the truck of defendant Gugle, and that
the truck on which decedent was riding was negligently driven
over a crossing of the defendant railroad by an employee of
Gugle. In a per curiam opinion, the court said:
" . .. There is no allegation of peculiar circumstances casting
a duty upon the plaintiff of warning the driver, or that plaintiff
possessed any knowledge of a peril which was imminent, or had
reason to believe that he was being placed in a hazardous situation
by the conduct of the driver."
In Keiner v. W1heeling & Lake Erie Ry.,6 the trial court had
directed a verdict for the defendant. The court said:
"The theory of the defendant company, which the trial court
apparently adopted is that a guest in an automobile is required,
as a matter of law, when the automobile approaches a known
railroad crossing, to look and listen for the approach of a train,
and that he must look and listen from a point and at a time
that will make his looking effective to apprise him whether danger
is near or not, and that, even though he testifies he looked and
listened and neither saw nor heard an approaching train, if the

only conclusion that can reasonably be reached upon the evidence
is that there is no doubt that, had he looked, he must have seen
the approaching train in time to avoid injury, he is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
impending danger or apparent lack of ordinary caution on the part of the
driver, it does not require him to use the same vigilance as is required of the
driver, nor put him under the same obligation to look for danger as is the
driver. . . 'Itis a matter of common knowledge that under ordinary circumstances such occupants do largely rely upon the driver, who has the exclusive control and management of the vehicle, exercising the required degree
of care, and for that reason courts are not justified in adopting a hard and fast
rule that they are guilty of negligence in doing so. Every case must depend
upon its own particular facts'."
5122 Ohio St. 557, 5,59, 172 N. E. 666 (1930).
134 Ohio App. 409, 171 N. E. 253 (1930). The plaintiff occupied the seat
.beside the driver of a truck which was struck by a train. The view of the
tracks was obscured by buildings up to within 25 feet of the tracks, and from
that point was interfered with by a bank more than five feet high. It was
not shown that trains were visible at any point before the truck was almost
upon the track.
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"It is conceded that such is the rule applied by our Supreme
Court to a driver of a vehicle upon a public highway. Detroit
T. & I. Rd. Co. v. Rohrs, 114 Ohio St., 493, 151 N. E. 714.
"But the Supreme Court has not yet determined that the
duty of a guest in an automobile being driven upon the public
highway, and approaching a known railroad crossing is the same
as the duty of the driver of the automobile. On the contrary,
the Supreme Court has distinctly recognized that the duty of a
guest in an automobile in reference to looking and listening to
avoid dangers incident to crossing a railroad track is not the
same as the duty of the driver with whom the guest is riding."
" . . . in determining whether or not a guest in an automobile
has exercised ordinary care for his own safety, consideration must
be given to the fact that he is not operating the automobile and
does not have the right to direct and control its operation.",
In Bailey v. Parker,8 the plaintiff was injured while riding as
a guest in the back seat of defendant's automobile. It was held
that the question of plaintiff's negligence in failing to protest
against the excessive speed at which the car was being driven
before and at the time of the accident, was solely for the determination of the jury.9
In Community Traction Company v. Konte,' ° it was held that
the court did not err in refusing to charge that it was the duty
of the plaintiff to keep watch of traffic lights along the street
upon which he was riding as a guest in an automobile which was
struck by defendant's bus at an intersection."
In Telling Belle Vernon Co. v. Krenz,12 it was said by the late
Judge Sullivan:
734 Ohio App. 409, 412, 171 N. E. 254 (1930).
834 Ohio App. 207, 170 N. E. 607 (1930).

934 Ohio App. 207, 214, 170 N. E. 610 (1930).
Plaintiff and defendant
were members of an orchestra, on their way to fill an engagement to play at
an amusement park. It was also held that the parties were not engaged in a
"joint enterprise".
1035 Ohio App. 361, 172 N. E. 442 (1930).
"The court said: "His duty was, of course, to exercise ordinary care, but it
would be going too far to specify in instructions to the jury that the particular duty of watching traffic lights constituted a part of the ordinary care
of a passenger. Although he was riding in the front seat beside the driver of
the car and was required to exercise his faculties of sight and hearing, it was
only his duty to exercise ordinary care, and what constituted such care was a
question for the jury." .
1234 Ohio App. 499, 171 N. E. 357 (1928).
Defendant's truck was turned
without warning directly in the path of the automobile in which plaintiff was
riding beside her husband, the driver.
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"We can only repeat what was said in Cleveland Ry. Co. v.
Jleller, 15 Ohio App. 346, that it is not necessary for an occupant
of a machine owned and driven by another to keep remonstrating
or interfering with the driver, or instructing the driver as to how
the machine shall be operated, for it is obvious that such interference more often would result in injury than in its prevention,
especially so in the instant case, where the wife herself was unacquainted with the operation of an automobile."
In Toledo Railways 6 Light Co. v. Mayers, 3 approved in
Hocking Valley Ry. v. Wykle," the plaintiff was seated beside
the driver of an automobile which was struck by an electric car
of the defendant at a crossing. In disapproving instructions to
the jury which were somewhat similar to those held improper in
Hocking Valley Ry. v. Wykle,1 1 the court stated that:
" ...it cannot be questioned that the plaintiff seated as he
was beside the driver, with apparently equal opportunity to observe impending dangers, and within easy access so as to readily
communicate to the driver the result of his observations, was
required to so use his faculties of sight and hearing to discover
dangers incident to such crossing and apprise the driver thereof,
as would a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence under
the same or similar circumstances."
In Board of Commissioners of Logan County v. Bicher,'6 it
was held that it was not error to refuse to give a charge which
required that the plaintiff's decedent, who was killed in an
accident while riding at night beside the driver of an automobile,
use reasonably his faculties of sight and hearing and warn the
driver of impending dangers. 17 In this case the automobile had
1393 Ohio St. 304, 311, 112 N. E. 1014, 1016 (1916).
14Supra note 3.
15Supra note 4. In the circuit court, Mayers v. Toledo Rys. & Light Co.,
35 0. C. C. 517, 520 (1915), it was said: "It is a fact known to everybody that
persons who are simply passengers or guests in a conveyance are often engaged
in conversation on a journey and are not giving very much heed to the immediate surrounding. They are conducting themselves just as people of

ordinary care and prudence are accustomed to conduct themselves under
such circumstances .
1698 Ohio St. 432, 436, 121 N. E. 535, 536 (1918).
17
The charge was: "I now charge you that Mr. Bicher seated as he was in
the front seat by the side of Mr. Adams, the driver, was required to reasonably
use his faculties of sight and hearing to observe and avoid any impending

dangers incident to such driving along a country pike during the nighttime,
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been driven into a creek which crossed the highway, the bridge
having been washed away some days previous to the accident.
It was apparently recognized by the court that the conduct
required of a guest where an automobile is about to go over a
railroad crossing with which the guest is familiar, may be different
from that required where the automobile is proceeding along a
highway uncrossed by railroad tracks. The court said, referring
to Toledo Railways & Light Co. v. Mayers :18
"In that case .

.

. it was held that ...

the guest is required to

exercise ordinary care for his own safety and to reasonably use
his faculties of sight and hearing to avoid danger incident to
crossing the track. But it is the function of the jury to determine
from the facts shown in each case whether the injured person
used such care, and what care the circumstances required.
"Plaintiff in error by the request made desired the court to
instruct the jury what in the particular circumstances of this
case a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would do.
Such a thing can only be determined from the circumstances,
and these the jury must find. They might find that under the
facts of a particular case a person who is not driving, but is
merely a guest, might under the circumstances disclosed in that
.case, rely on the driver without being negligent or imprudent.
Especially would this be true if there was nothing. in, the situation indicating probable danger."
In Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Lindahl,9 the plaintiff's
decedent was a guest, occupying the rear seat of an. automobile
which was struck by defendant's train. It was said by the court
that:
"It was a question of fact whether Lindahl saw the train in
time to avoid the accident so far as he was concerned, and used
the requisite degree of care, and that question was rightly submitted to the jury."
In Smith v. The Cleveland Ry., 20 there having been a verdict
and judgment for the defendant street railway company, it was
and apprise the driver of the machine as would a person of rcasonable and
ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances."
8

" Supra note 13.

19111 Ohio St. 502, 509, 146 N. E. 71 (1924).
was entirely unfamiliar with the surroundings.
2"30 Ohio App. 21, 24, 164 N. E. 59 (1928).

In this castu tlh

passenger

The plaintiff occipied the
seat beside the driver. The automobile, which had been standing at the curb,
was driven out into the street in an attempt to turn around an(l proceed in the
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held that the court had not erred in submitting the question of
plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury, since there was
"some evidence . . . to show that the guest or passenger attempted to adopt the role of assumption of responsibility in
ascertaining whether it was safe . . ." It was said by the court:
"Had the passenger remained inactive and assumed no responsibility, and had he been inert in his conduct, the conclusion
would be otherwise, and the case would come under those authorities which make it reversible error to inject the issue of contributory negligence into a case when it was not there by the pleadings
or by the evidence. Had the passenger or guest remained passive,
there would be no vestige of contributory negligence; but it is
clear that there was some evidence at least tending to show that
in connection with the driver he at least assumed to view the
situation with the ultimate object of ascertaining the safety or
the danger of crossing the tracks while the street railway car
was a short distance to the east and proceeding toward the
automobile."
In.Lindeman v. Roche,2 after holding that the court had erred
in charging that there could be no recovery if plaintiff's decedent had acquiesced in and consented to the excessive speed
which caused the accident. The court said:
"Again, the charge is erroneous in that it undertakes to lay
down a rule of conduct relating to specific acts involved and
undertakes to state which of such acts would constitute negligence
or contributory negligence that would bar recovery. This is
in direct conflict with Toledo Rys. & Light Co. v. Mayers, 93
Ohio St. 304, and Commissioners of Logan County v. Bicher,
Admx., 98 Ohio St. 432. It was a question for the jury to determine
upon all the facts of the case whether or not the guest used due
care under all the circumstances. As the court said in Commissioners v. Bicher, supra, it is in every case the function of the
jury to determine from the facts shown whether the injured
person used such care, and what care the circumstances required."
In Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bacon,22 it was held that
the passenger, whether seated beside the driver or behind him,
opposite direction. While turning, the car was struck from behind by a
street car of the defendant.
2118 Ohio App. 366 (1923).
2230 Ohio App. 295, 165 N. E. 48 (1928).

Here the plaintiff's decedent was

riding as the guest of the driver on a bus ordinarily used for transporting
school children.
from the train.

The ,eceflcnt occupied one of the side seats, facing away
He could have seen the train if he had looked.

WITH THE OHIO COURTS-EDITORIAL NOTES

may rely upon the skill and care of the driver "at least until
something appears to show that the driver is not performing
his duty." It was the opinion of the court that the guest or
passenger is not bound to look or listen or give warning to the
driver unless "the driver is not looking and listening or is not
exercising due care".
This view has been expressed in other decisions of the court
of appeals.3 It has even been held that it was error to submit
to the jury the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence,
where the plaintiff, a guest in the front seat of an automobile
had merely failed to protest against a continued speed of forty
to forty-five miles an hour on a highway at night. 4 The contrary is generally considered to be the law. 25 It has also been
held that the mere fact that three persons occupied the front
seat of an automobile which ran into the rear of the defendant's
unlighted truck at night warranted the court in submitting the
issue of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, one of the
occupants of the front seat, to the jury. 26 And where the plaintiff, riding in the rear seat, failed to request the driver to stop,
when she saw defendant's automobile approaching the intersection at which a collision occurred, even though the driver also
saw defendant's -car, it was held that the issue of plaintiff's
negligence was properly submitted to the jury. 7
3
Cleveland Railway Co. v. Heller, 15 Ohio App. 346, 349 (1921). Here it
was said: "Must he keep remonstrating with the driver, telling the driver to
do this or do that? It seems to us that it might be safely assumed by the
passenger that the driver knew how to handle the car, and was driving it in a
proper manner, and would be able to take care of it, and the passenger is not
called upon to remonstrate or to talk to the driver constantly."
In Toledo & Ohio Central Ry. v. Fippin, 32 Ohio C. C. 755 (1910) (aff'd, 86
Ohio St. 334, 99 N. E. 1134), it was said: "Mrs. Fippin had a right to trust in
her husband as the head of the family, and his judgment and skill as a driver,
and that he would heed all apparent warnings and avoid all apparent dangers."
Toledo Con. St. Ry v. Rohner, 9 Ohio C. C. 702, 705-706 (1895), is to the
same effect.
2
'Wills v, Anchor Cartage & Storage Co., 26 Ohio App. 66, 159 N. E. 124
(1926).

'Rogers v. Ziegler, 21 Ohio App: 186, 152 N. E. 781 (1925); Bailey v. Parker,
supra note 8; Schell v. Dubois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N. E. 664 (1916); Makranczy v. Gelfand, 109 Ohio St. 325, 336-337, 142 N. E. 688 (1924).
2Rogcrs v. French Bros., Bauer Co., 31 Ohio App. 77, 166 N. E. 427 (1928).
2
M:Ltis v. Woodruff, 31 Ohio App. 73, 166 N. E. 203 (1928).
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Although the courts have refused to say that the guest or
passenger must look or listen, if he happens to see or hear something dangerous, he is under a duty, to himself at least, to warn
28
the driver of the danger. In Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Sanders,
it was said:
"The admission of plaintiff that while sitting on the seat
with the driver she saw the approaching car nearly half a square
away, in the absence of any attempt to warn the driver, raises
a presumption of negligence on the part of plaintiff which was
not removed and entitled the defendant to an instructed verdict.
In Tyler v. The Hocking Valley Ry., 9 affirming judgment on
a verdict for the defendant, where the plaintiff, seated beside
the driver, had an opportunity to see the train, which was approaching from the right side, at all times after the automobile
was four hundred feet from the crossing and the train a thousand
feet away, the court said:
"On the other hand, plaintiff's decedent was required to use
ordinary care in the exercise of her own faculties in looking and
listening as she approached the crossing and the court did not
err in giving the law as to contributory negligence. The inference
arises from the evidence that decedent did not exercise ordinary
care in looking and listening or she would have heard the whistle
and seen the train and warned the driver of its approach."
Apparently the early tendency of the Ohio courts was to
require the same vigilance of gratuitous passengers as of drivers
at railway crossings with which the parties were familiar. In
Toledo & O C. Ry. v. Eatherton,0 where the plaintiff was one of
several guests in a wagon which was struck by defendant's train
at a crossing, none of the occupants of the wagon having looked
before going on the crossing, it was said:
2832 Ohio C. C. 413 (1909).

Here the plaintiff was seated beside the driver

of a wagon which was struck by a street car at an intersection of streets. And
see quotation from Myers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., supra.
In Toledo, etc., Ry. v. Fippin, supra note 23, it was said: "If she saw or
heard anything indicating danger that th( driver could not, or probably did
not see or hear, it was her duty to tell him. We think it is not incumbent
upon a passenger in a wagon to tell the driver of every approaching vehicle,
and every car, car track, hole in the ro:ol, stone, or gutter."
2928 Ohio App. 88, 162 N. E. 623 (1926).
1120 Ohio C. C. 297, 301 (1896).
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"It was as much the duty of the occupant of the wagon to
look and listen in approaching a dangerous crossing as it was
that of the driver . . . to protect themselves . . . he must use

his senses, look to see, listen to hear ....
" ...although she was a passenger ...it was her duty to look
and listen for the approach of trains; and if she had looked and
listened as it was her legal duty, a hundred feet away from the
railroad crossing, she would not have been injured . . . and for

failure to do that they did not exercise the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would have exercised, and in failing to do that
she contributed to her own injury. ' '3
It is well settled that in the absence of a relationship of master
and servant, principal and agent, partnership, or of "joint enterprise, the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to the
occupant of a vehicle.12 And where the suit is between parties
to the "joint enterprise", the negligence of one will not be
imputed to the other. 3 Incidentally, there is much confusion as
to what circumstances constitute a "joint enterprise',' in negligence
cases. In the syllabus of Bloom v. Leech, 4 it is stated that:
"A 'joint enterprise' within the law of imputed negligence is
the joint prosecution of a common purpose under such circumstances that each member of such enterprise has the authority
to act for all in respect to the control of the agencies employed
to execute such common purpose."
New York, -C. &" St. L. R. R. v. Kistler,35 is accepted as the

Ohio example of a "joint enterprise" within which the negligence
of each party will be imputed to the others. In that case the
court stated that it found a "joint enterprise" between a deaf
father and his daughter whom he had taken along in a buggy
to "hear for him". In holding that the court had erred in charg-.
31

This decision was followed in Pennsylvania Co. v. Stahl, 15 Ohio C. C.
353, 34 Ohio C; C. 157 (1912), which was reversed without opinion in
Stahl v. Pennsylvania Co., 88 Ohio St. 535, 106 N. E. 1052 (1913).
32
Hocking Valley Ry. v. Wykle, supra note 1;Bailey v. Parker, supra note 8;
(N.s.)

Bloomv. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N. E. 137 (1929); Pennsylvania R. R. v.

Lindahl, supra note .19; Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Wright, 54 Ohio St. 181, 43
N. E. 688 (1896); Toledo Railways & Light Co. v. Mayers, supra note 13
3

3Bloom v. Leech, supra note 32; Bailey v. Parker, supra note 8.
"Supra note 32. On the doctrine of "joint enterprise", see 38 YALE L. J.
810 (1929).
3166 Ohio St. 326, 343, 64 N. E. 130, 135 (1902).
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ing that the negligence, if any, of the father was not imputable
to the daughter, it was said:
-The father being nearly deaf, took the daughter along to
hear for him, and as they came to the west side of the piece of
woods, he told her to look and listen for trains, and she did so
by raising the rear curtain and looking in the direction of the
railroad.
"If it be true that she was to do the listening, and also to
assist in the looking while he was doing the driving, they were
engaged in a joint enterprise, and each would in such case be
chargeable with the negligence of the other."
In Bloom v. Leech, the court explained the holding that there
was a joint enterprise between the plaintiff and her father in
N. Y. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Kistler, as follows:
"It is apparent that in the above case the duty to listen was
upon the daughter, and to assist in the looking, and the control
of the enterprise was therefore with the daughter as to the obligation to listen before going upon the track. She had the right of
control to this extent."
This language in Bloom v. Leech, is followed immediately by
the statement that:
"The principle of joint enterprise is based on partnership or
mutual agency. In crossing accidents of this character, the test
in determining the question is whether the parties were jointly
operating or controlling the movements of the vehicle in which
they were riding. There must be a right of mutual control. 3
Apparently the supreme court said in Bloom v. Leech that in
Railroad v. Kistler, the daughter's obligation to listen, and to
assist in looking, that obligation being created by the request
or command of her parent, gave to her a joint control of or right
to control the driving, and that this joint control or right of
control which was attached to this obligation to listen, in turn
created a "joint enterprise" within which the negligence of one
would be imputed to the other. From this it would seem to
follow that if the driver of a vehicle requests a guest to look or
6120 Ohio St. 239, 245, .166 N. E. 137, 138 (1929).
It should be noticed
that the looking which was done by the daughter in Railroad v. Kistler, supra
note 35, took place hetwccn points 1468 feet and 216 feet away from the
crossing, 66 Ohio St. 326, 328-329, 64 N. E. 130 (1902).
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listen for trains or cars at a crossing, or even if the guest voluntarily assumes the duty of looking or listening, a joint control
or right of control is created and the parties are then engaged
in a "joint enterprise". It appears that either the above statement is the law, or that which was a "joint enterprise" at the
time of the decision in Railroad v. Kistler is no longer a "joint
enterprise".
It is significant that in Railroadv. Kistler, the court considered
that the plaintiff herself had been negligent, aside from any
negligence of her father which might be imputed to her. It was
stated in the opinion that:
"The time to look and listen for the last time is shortly before
going upon the track as before explained, and as the train was near
enough to catch her before getting over the crossing at a fast
trot or gallop, the train must have been far past the cheiry tree
when she should have looked the last time." 37
The borderland between decisions imputing the negligence of
the driver to a guest because of a "joint enterprise", and decisions holding a passenger guilty of contributory negligence of
his own because of his failure to look and listen and warn the
driver of danger, is occupied by those cases which hold that if the
passenger does in fact look out for danger, he is or may be held
negligent if he fails to see observable dangers and warn the
driver of them. 8
Unless there is actually a duty on the passenger to look, there
appears to be no reason for holding that if the passenger does
look he is bound to see observable dangers. If the passenger
is negligent if he does not observe apparent dangers when he
chooses to look, it seems to follow that he is under a duty, at
least to himself, to look for dangers. The duty to see necessarily
includes the lesser duty of looking.
The rule of law requiring -drivers of vehicles to stop, look and
listen before going over railroad crossings is so firmly settled39
that it is surprising that the courts should refuse to fix any
3766 Ohio St. 326, 343, 64 N. E. 130, 135 (1902).

3'Smith v. The Cleveland Ry., supra note 20; Eric R. R. v. ]lurlburt, 221
Fed. 907 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915), holding that verdict should have been directed
for defendant railroad, where passenger in automobile testified she had looked
and listened, but did not see or hear approaching train which facts showed
was plainly visible.
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minimum standard of conduct for passengers in private vehicles.
The fact that the passenger has no control over the mechanism
would seem to be offset, so far as any duty to look is concerned,
by the fact that the passenger has A greater opportunity for
observation. It is inconceivable, in spite of the stress which
some courts have put on this point, that the danger to travelers
in a motor vehicle would be increased by a warning from a guest
to the driver that a train was approaching a nearby crossing.
A warning in this situation certainly is not "back seat driving".
If such warning would increase the danger, it would seem that
crossing signs, watchmen, gates, automatic signalling devices,
and locomotive whistles and bells would have the same effect.
The position of the courts with regard to the positive duty of
the driver of a vehicle at a railroad crossing is sufficient answer
to any statement that the courts cannot define a standard of
conduct which must be followed by a passenger under the same
circumstances. The passenger moves forward at the same speed,
in the same vehicle, and is subject to the same -dangers as the
driver. It is submitted that if the passenger chooses to rely
upon the care and skill of the driver and to do no looking and
listening on his own behalf, he should be held to have done so
at his own risk.4 ° It may well be questioned whether it is desirable either as a matter of law or of social policy that one who
rides onto a railroad crossing without making any attempt to
observe the approach of a train, may be found to have exercised
39
The Pennsylvania R. R. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 530, 159 N. E. 826 (1927).
Part of the syllabus in this case is: "When a traveler upon a public highway
approaches a steam railway which intersects at grade the highway, with one
or more tracks, with an intention of crossing over, it is the duty of such traveler,
before going upon the railway, to look both ways and listen for the approach
of trains; and such looking and listening must be at such time and place and
in such manner as will be effective to accomplish the ends designed thereby ...
If his failure to look in the direction from which a train is approaching, at a
time and place when such looking would be effective, results in an injury to
himself when the same might have been avoided had he so looked, such conduct constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law that will prevent
a recovery."
'Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 69, 70, 48 Sup.
Ct. 24 (1927). "When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he
goes to a place where lie will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is
clear of the track. '. . It seems to us that if he relies upon not hearing the train
or any signal and takes no further precaution he does so at his own risk."
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ordinary care under the circumstances. In what.other way can
any care at all be exercised except by looking and listening and
giving timely warning to the driver?
We are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when
the standard
is clear, it should be laid down once for all by the
' 41
courts.

"There is also no doubt, where the facts are undisputed or
clearly preponderant, that the question of negligence is one
of law." 42
"It cannot be that the theory of the law requires it to be left
to the uncertain judgment of a jury in every case." 4'
So far as the Ohio cases have gone, it appears that it is to be left
to the jury to decide in each case whether the passenger is -required
to do any looking or listening at all, under instructions that the
passenger must exercise ordinary care and make such reasonable
use of his faculties of sight and hearing as would be made by an
ordinarily prudent person -under the same circumstances. The
courts have refused to permit instructions that the passenger
must look or listen, even though looking and listening are the only
known methods of exercising the faculties of sight and hearing.
It is submitted that there should be established as a matter of
law a standard of conduct requiring automobile passengers to
look, listen and give warning to the driver at known or observable
railway crossings. This view has been adopted in many jurisdictions. 4 4
JOHN S. BACHMAN.
11B. & 0. R. R. v. Goodman, supra note 40..
"2Southern Pacific Co. v. Pool, 160 U. S. 438, 440, 16 Sup. Ct. 338 (1896).
uSouthern Pacific Co. v. Berkshire, 254 U. S. 415, 417, 41 Sup,. Ct. 162 (1921).
14Davis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 159 Fed. 10 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); Brommer v. Pennsylvania R. R., 179 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919) (certiorari denied, 223 U. S.718, 33 Sup. Ct. 522); Bradley v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 288 Fed.
484 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 4th,
1923); Noble v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 298 Fed. 381 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924);
Parramore v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 5 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925),
(certiorari denied, 269 U. S.560, 46 Sup. Ct. 20); Kuminma v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry., 23 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); 1all v: West Jersey & S. R. R.,
244 Fed. 104 (C. C. A. 3rd, 19.17); Cooper v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. Ry., 117 Kan.
703, 232 Pac. 1024 (1925); Dale v. Jaeger, 44 Idaho 576, 258 Pac. 1081 (1927),
(failure to protest against excessive speed held negligence as matter of law);
Ferguson v. Lamiig, 126 Kan. 273, 268 Pac. 117 (1928), (holding passenger
negligeut for failure to look and see defendant's automobile approaching in-
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DESTRUCTION OF A TESTAMENTARY

TRUST BY AGREEMENT

AS

INCIDENTAL TO THE COMPROMISE OF A WILL CONTEST

The case of Madden v. Schallenberger,t involves the very interesting question of the power of a court of equity to substitute a
consensual for a testamentary trust as one of the elements of a
compromise of an action to contest a will. The guardians of
certain minor beneficiaries under a testamentary trust brought
an action under section 10857, Ohio General Code, seeking the
tersection); Kirby v. Kansas City, K. W. & W. R. R., 106 Kan. 163, 186 Pac.
744 (1920); Howe v. Carey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N. W. 791 (1920); Martin v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 265 Pa. 282, 108 Atl. 631 (1919); Renner v. Tone, 273 Pa.
10, 116 At!. 512 (1922); Wagenbauer v, Schwinn, 285 Pa. 128, 131 At. 699
(1926); Harris v. Spokane P. & S. Ry., 123 Wash. 274, 212 Pac. 187 (1923);
Sadler v. Northern Pac. Ry., 118 Wash. 121, 203 Pac. 10 (1921); LaGoy v.
Director General of Railroads, 231 N. Y. 191, 131 N. E. 886 (1921); Hancock
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 149 Va. 829, 141 S. E. 849 (1928); Louisville & N. R. R.
v. Anderson, 159 Tenn. 55, 15 S. W. (2d) 753 (1929); Pigeon v. Massachusetts
N. E. S. R. R., 230 Mass. 392, 1-19 N. E. 762 (1918), (plaintiff looked but did
not see car); Fogg v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 Mass. 444, 111 N. E.
960 (1916); Wilbur Motors, Inc. v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 170 N. E.. 922
(Mass., 1930); Grant v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 78 Mont. 97, 252 Pac. 382
(1927); Beemer v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 181 Iowa 642, 162 N. W. 43 (1917);
Sackett v. Chicago G. W. R. R., 187 Iowa 994, 174 N. W. 65S (1919), (guest on
rear seat of motorcycle); Seiffert v. Hines, 108 Neb. 62, 187 N. W. lOS (1922);
Morris v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 101 Neb. 479, 163 N. W. 799 (1917); Jameson
v. Norfolk,& W. Ry., 97 W. Va. 119, 124 S. E. 491 (1924); Waller v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., 152 S. E. 13 (W. Va., 1930); Brickell v. New York Central & H. R. R.,
120 N. Y. 290, 24 N. E. 449 (1890); ("It is no less the duty of the passenger,
where he has the opportunity to do so, than of the driver, to learn of danger
and avoid it, if practicable."-wagon); Pouch v. Staten Island M. Ry.,. 142
App. Div. 16, 126 N. Y. Supp. 738 (1910); Kamillowitz v. Cumberland County
Power & L. Co., 119 Me. 588, 109 Atl. 487 (1920), (guest on truck which was
backed onto tracks in turning around); Blanchard v. Maine Central R. R., 116
Me. 179, 100 Atl. 666 (1917); Opp v. Pryor, 294 I11.
538, 547, 128 N. E. 580,
584 (1920); Pence v. Hines, 221 Ill.
App. 584 (1921); Greenstreet v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., 234 111. App. 339 (1924); Miller v. Louisville N. A. & C. Ry.,
128 Ind. 97, 27 N. E. 339 (1891), (wagon); Lawrence v. Denver & R. G.
R. R., 52 Utah 414, 174 Pac. 817 (1918); Dummer v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & L. Co., 108 Wis. 589, 84 N. W. 853 (1901); Texas Mexican Ry. v. Hoy,
24 S. W. (2d) 18 (Tex. Com. App., 1930); See Sullivan v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 317 Mo. 996, 297 S. W. 945, 949 (1927).
The cases on this question are
collected in annotations in 18 A. L. R. 309, 22 A. L. R. 1294, 41 A. L. R. 768,
47 A. L. R. 293, 63 A. L. R. 1432, 20 A. 1,. R. 1026, 26 A. L. R. 1421, 40 A. L.
R. 1338.
'121 Ohio St. 401, 169 N. E. 461 (192'u1.
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direction of the court on the settlement of an action to contest
a will brought by the heirs at law of the testatrix. The trial and
appellate courts by their decrees confirmed a contract between
the plaintiffs and the heirs at law by the terms of which the heirs
at law received substantial sums from the estate in lieu of their
interests under the will, and, the estates of the minors, who
succeeded only as beneficiaries under the will, were relieved of
many conditions and restrictions imposed by the will. The
agreement confirmed by the decrees of the lower courts relieved
the estates of the minors of certain spendthrift characteristics
imposed by the will, accelerated the time for the receipt of income, substituted another for the testamentary trustee and provided for the administration of the trust in accordance with the
provisions of the contract rather the terms of the will. The
testamentary trustee instituted error proceedings to the supreme
court and the decree was there affirmed in so far as it provided
for the settlement of the claims of the heirs at law and reversed
in so far as it attempted the removal of the testamentary trustee
and the substitution of the consensual trust in place of the trust
created by the will.
The decision may be summarized as follows:
First: An heir at law in consideration of a forebearance to
contest a will may secure an outright settlement the direct
by the terms of
effect of which is to terminate a trust created
2
the will for the benefit of such heir at law.

Second: An agreement made in consideration of the forebearance of an heir at law to contest a will cannot have the effect of
enlarging the interest of one who succeeds only by virtue of the
provisions of the will, or, to state it differently, the beneficiaries
by a contract, the object of which is to preserve the trust estate,
cannot enlarge their own interests with or without the assistance
of a court of equity.'
2The will provided for a payment of $1500 per year to each of the two daughtersof the testatrix and in the discretion of the trustee an additional 61000 per
year until November 14,1932. At that date each daughter was to receive $25,000
outright and the income from a $75,000 trust fund for life. The contract
provided for the immediate payment of $100,000 to each daughter and $2500
estate,
per year. Each daughter was to have a life estate in one-twelfth of tile
and out of these separate portions $25,000 outright on November 14, 1932,
and the income from the balance for life.
Uin re Stoffel's Estate, 295 Pa. 248, 145 Ati. 70 (1929), is to the same effect
in so far as the enlargement of the rights of beneficiaries, not heirs at law, is
concerned.
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Third: A testamentary trustee has a sufficient legal interest
to resist the destruction of the trust notwithstanding that its
destruction is concurred in by all parties beneficially interested.
Fourth: Sections 12079 to 12087 inclusive, General Code,
affqrd the exclusive mode of setting aside a will in Ohio.
The fourth summary is not a novel statement of law in the
state of Ohio and may be dismissed with the bare reference that
it conforms to the local practice for many years.' The third
summary seems self-evident as the trustee of an active trust has
never been relegated to the position of a mere stakeholder or
inter-pleader in courts of equity.'
A comparison of the first and second propositions decided in
the case under consideration gives rise to the natural inquiry as
to the basis of the distinction made by the court. The distinction
cannot rest upon any difference between the nature of the interests of the beneficiaries and the heirs at law, nor upon any
difference in the consideration furnished by either of these classes
of persons. The real basis for the distinction lies in the fact that
the confirming of the agreement with the heirs averted a threatened disaster to the trust estate of the other beneficiaries while
the proposed changes in the interests of the other beneficiaries
did not have the effect of accomplishing any such result.' The
4

Cooch v. Cooch, 18 Ohio 146 (1849); Holt v. Lamb, 17 Ohio St. 374 (1867);
Wagner v. Ziegler, 44 Ohio St. 59, 4 N. E. 705 (1886).
5
"The trustees are the representatives of the dead donor in his wishes."
Judge Cooley in Cheever v. Washtenaw, 45 Mich. 6, 7 (1880). "The absolute
and positive duty is imposed upon him to defend the life of the trust whenever
it is assailed, if the means of defense are known to him or can with diligence be
discovered."
Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. V. 326, 332, 32 N. E. 1088 (1893).
Cf. Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill.165, 156 N. E. 334 (1927), which contains
language to the effect that it is no concern of the trustee how the parties
beneficially interested settle the controversy if the trustee is protected in
making distribution. The distinction is that the res there in controversy was
intestate property because of the Illinois statute against the accumulation of
income and was therefore held by the trustee as a bare stakeholder.
6

1t is interesting to compare the case under discussion with In re Stoffel's
Estate, supra note 3. There the court refused to confirm any part of such
an agreement after finding that there was insufficient evidence upon which to
predicate an action to contest the will of the testator. It is interesting to
speculate concerning the action of anlOhio court in the event that the insufficiency of the threatened will contest was uirged. Cf. Collins v. Collins, 151
Wash. 201, 275 Pac. 571 (1929), which is to the effect that a contract to suppress a will is valid regardless of any lack of merit in the threatened contest.
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question of the degree of danger to the trust estate necessary
to justify the action of a court of equity in destroying a portion
of the trust created is not discussed, but since the demurrer
admitted a grave danger to the estates of the minor beneficiaries
through the threatened will contest as alleged in the petition the
existence of this fact must be conceded. 7 The courts of Ohio
have uniformly adhered to the doctrine that an active trust
could not be terminated nor' the interests thereunder enlarged
by the act or agreement of the beneficiaries' and this decision
constitutes an exception to rather than a departure from that
rule. Undoubtedly, however, a convenient method is at hand
for the destruction of a testamentary trust by an heir at law and
the extent to which the courts will permit its utilization can only
be conjectured at this time. It does not seem likely that the
heirs at law could contract with the devisees to have the will
declared invalid and thus strangle the trust. 9 On the other hand
it is not improbable that a contract by one or all of the heirs at
law to refrain from contesting a will in consideration of an outright payment would leave the trust moribund since it is a usual
condition for the heir at law under such a contract to surrender
the interest received under the will. The daughters of the
testatrix, who were her sole heirs at law, did that very thing in
the case under discussion.
Since the basis of the court's decision rests upon averting
danger to the trust estate, the prevention of the enlargement or
extension of the interests of the minor beneficiaries is the correct
and natural result. In the language of the decision to permit
otherwise would be for such beneficiaries to lift themselves by
'If the heir at law should demand as part of the consideration for the forebearance a change in the terms of the testamentary trust, will the desire of a
court of equity to preserve the trust and the estate of the minor beneficiaries
justify an approval of such an arrangement?
8

Robins v. Robins, 72 Ohio St. 1, 73 N. E. 1051 (1905). Nor can the concerted action of the beneficiaries enlarge the interests given them by the terms
of the testamentary trust even on the assumption that the testator would have
so done had certain later circumstances been present at the time of the creation
of the trust.
Jnion Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Alter, 103 Ohio St. 188,
132 N. F,. 834 (1921).
9
1n Cuthblrt v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, a contract between the heirs and
devisecs coRitiI-jdating a judgment avoiding a will and destroying a testamentary trust was Iheld void. Rohr v. Gatch, 21 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 65 (1917);
Walker v. Hollister, 20 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 225 (1917).
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their own bootstraps. The effect of the decision denuded of its
legal aspects is somewhat unfortunate, however, as its direct
result is to determine the destructibility or indestructibility of a
testamentary trust according to the ability or inability of the
person threatening its destruction to bring himself within a class,
the members of which might accomplish that purpose. The
result is that the remedies of a beneficiary depend upon circumstances wholly fortuitous and under such circumstances it is
debatable whether public policy would not be better served by
permitting the living under the guidance of a court of equity
to allocate in a manner most productive of the common good
wealth which the dead have bestowed grudgingly and with
res'ervations. Cases which seem contrary to the case under
discussion have their basis in statutes declaring that policy."
It is submitted that the enactment of a statute which would
permit the adjustment of the rights of beneficiaries under long
term trusts to suit the needs of the beneficiaries and the economic
changes during the period of the trust would be beneficial for
many reasons only a few of which have been discussed in this
GEORGE E. FEE.

paper.

A SUPREME COURT OPINION CONTRADICTING

THE

SCINTILLA RULE

The opinion of the supreme court in Cleveland Railway Co. v.
Kukucz' cannot logically co-exist with the scintilla rule and,
therefore, imperatively requires a re-examination of that troublesome doctrine and a deliberate choice between it and the case
referred to.
1
°The case of Wolf v. Uhlemann 325 111, 165, 145 N. E. 334 (1927), Which
seems to accomplish the result contended for on behalf of the beneficiaries in
the instant case rests upon the fact that the property which was the subject of
the agreement was in reality intestate property because of the provision of the
Illinois statute against the accumulation of income. ILL. Rev. STAT., c. 30,
sec. 153, p. 636. Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N. W. 1008 (1923).
While seemingly at variance with the instant casc may be explained by the
provisions of the Michigan Statutes. See Act of August 18, 1921. See In re
Lacroix's Estate, 244 Mich. 148, 221 N. W. 165 (1928), justifying an agreement
of settlement which invalidated a will by a consent verdict. See Shermann v.
Warren, 211 Mass. 288, and MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921), c. 204, sec. 15.
1121 Ohio St. 468, 169 N. E. 564 (1929).
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The plaintiff in the Kukucz case sought damages for injuries
claimed to have resulted from the defendant's negligence. The
latter denied the allegations of negligence and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff directly contributing to the injuries in question. At the close of the plaintiff's
evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict. This
motion was overruled and the defendant thereupon went forward
with its proof, calling numerous witnesses. At the close of all
the evidence the defendant again moved for a directed verdict
and this motion was granted. The plaintiff prosecuted error to
the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court "for error in
directing the verdict". The supreme court reversed the court
of appeals and affirmed the trial court, saying:
"The record discloses that both parties offered evidence, but
that the evidence offered by the defendant was not incorporated
in the bill. The motion of the defendant for a directed verdict
was made and sustained at the close of the evidence. What
the proof offered by the defendant was, whether it countervailed the proof of plaintiff on the issue of negligence, or sustained
its issue of contributory negligence, neither the Court of Appeals
nor this Court has the means of knowing. The missing evidence
may have fully sustained the Court's ruling in directing the
verdict."
All of the members of the supreme court concurred in the
opinion except Judge Robinson who did not participate.
It will be observed that the supreme court did not reverse the
court of appeals because the plaintiff's own evidence entitled the
defendant to a directed verdict, but reversed on the sole ground
that the defendant's evidence, which was missing from the bill
of exceptions, may have fully sustained the trial court's ruling.
The clearest principles of logic compel the conclusion that the
supreme court must have considered that the plaintiff had made
at least a primafacie case, for if the court had been of the opinion
that the plaintiff's evidence did not raise even a scintilla, the
natural and reasonable and customary procedure would have
been to reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court
on that ground. If the plaintiff had not introduced "some evidence" there was no occasion to rest the decision upon the absence
of defendant's evidence from the bill of exceptions. But the
supreme court held that it could not pass on the propriety of the
directed verdict because the defendant's evidence was not in-
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corporated in the bill. The only rational inference is that the
plaintiff's evidence was, in itself, sufficient to require submission
to the jury.
Indeed, we are not left to inference, however compelling. The
court has stated its position with great clarity:
"What the proof offered by the defendant was, whether it
countervailed the proof of plaintiff on the issue of negligence, or
sustained its issue of contributory negligence, neither the Court
of Appeals nor this Court has the means of knowing. The missing
evidence may have fully sustained the trial court's ruling in directing
the verdict." (Italics ours.)
Unless the plaintiff's evidence had raised at least a scintilla
there was nothing to countervail, and no occasion to inquire
whether the issue of contributory negligence had been sustained.
It follows necessarily that the plaintiff must have introduced
"some evidence". There is simply no escape from that conclusion.
In this connection it is pertinent to observe that in two previous
trials the plaintiff had obtained a verdict from the jury. One
of these verdicts was set aside by the trial court as being against
the weight of the evidence, indicating that he, too, considered that
the plaintiff had introduced "some evidence", 2 for if there had not
been at least a scintilla there was, beyond question, nothing to
weigh. In another trial the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant upon which judgment was entered. This was reversed and the case remanded by the court of appeals "for error
in the charge of the court, no other error appearing in the record".
It would seem, therefore, that the court of appeals considered
that the plaintiff had introduced "sonic evidence"-otherwise
(1) the error in the charge could not have been the only error, and
(2) in any event the plaintiff could not have been prejudiced by
the charge, no matter how erroneous.
'His written opinion concluded as follows:
"All in all, the Court cannot reconcile this verdict with the weight of the
evidence. The Court, however, does want the entry in the ease to affirmatively
show that the ground for sustaining the motion for a new trial is that the
verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, so that plaintiff's
right may be protected under the statute in the event that the case is again
tried and goes to a verdict in his behalf."
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Thus, before the case reached the supreme court, a common
pleas judge had found and the court of appeals had twice found
that the plaintiff was entitled to determination by a jury of the
issues presented, and two juries had returned verdicts in his
favor, all of which agrees with the only conclusion which can
rationally be drawn from the opinion of the supreme court,
namely, that the plaintiff had introduced at least a scintilla of
evidence.
How, then, could it possibly make any difference, under the
scintilla rule, what the defendant's evidence was?3 Yet the
supreme court held that, in the absence of the defendant's evidence,
it could do nothing but reverse the court of appeals and affirm the
trial court. The utter antithesis between that and the scintilla
rule cannot be escaped. Like crabbed age and youth, they
cannot live together.
3

1n the Kukucz case the bill of exceptions shows only that "numerous
witnesses were called in behalf of the defendant". It is therefore possible to
argue as follows: So far as appears from the bill of exceptions the defendant
may have called the plaintiff as its own witness. If the defendant did call the
plaintiff as its own witness, the plaintiff's testimony, given by him as a part
of the defendant's case, may have contained admissions requiring a directed
verdict for the defendant. Therefore, since every presumption must be
indulged in favor of a judgment, the supreme court not only properly sustained
the trial court in directing a verdict, but its holding cannot be said to conflict
with the scintilla rule for the reason that, a party being bound by his-own
testimony, a directed verdict against the plaintiff on the basis of his statements
as a witness for the defendant, is entirely outside the scope of the scintilla rule.
Abstractly the foregoing argument is sound. It loses all force, however,
when subjected to a little scrutiny in the light of experience.
If the defendant in, the Kukucz case called the plaintiff to disprove his own
(plaintiff's) allegations of negligence on the part of the defendant, or to prove
its (defendant's) allegations of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it was certainly a most extraordinary proceeding. No competent trial
lawyer would have thought of doing such a thing. The plaintiff testified in
his own behalf and all that the defendant could hope to get from him was
available on cross-examination; and the plaintiff was, in fact, cross-examined
at length. Therefore, while, in theory, the defendant may have called the
plaintiff as its witness, nevertheless it is a moral certainty that the defendant
actually did no such foolish thing.
If the supreme court, in deciding as it did, had in mind the argument under
discussion, it was flying in the face of reality. In the absence of a statement
by the court to that effect, we cannot suppose that it took so extravagant a
position. If it considered this aspect of the matter at all (and there is nothing
to indicate that it did), the court must certainly have taken judicial notice of
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As stated in the leading case of Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life
Insurance & Trust Company,4 the scintilla rule is as follows:
"Wherever there is any evidence, however slight, tending to
prove the facts essential to make out a case for the plaintiff, a
non-suit cannot be properly ordered; it is in no case a question
as to the weight, but as to the relevancy of the testimony."
If that be the law the directed verdict in the Kukucz case is
simply unthinkable. Yet the supreme court reversed the court
of appeals and affirmed the trial court. What then is the law?
In all deference it is submitted that the majority have gotten
themselves into a position where they are simultaneously affirming contradictory propositions.
There is another aspect of this matter which leads to the same
conclusion. Mr. Metzler 5 says:
"Where an issue has been made by the pleadings which has
not been waived, and evidence on the subject, but not conclusive
in law, has been submitted, the failure of a party to contradict
the evidence produced is not an admission of the facts; for the
jury may not believe the evidence. And a charge to the jury
that such fact is uncontroverted and has been established is
prejudicial error."
Certainly it has been the general understanding of bench and
bar in this state that, in sustaining a party's motion for a directed
verdict, his own evidence cannot be considered, even though not
contradicted by the evidence of his opponent. That proposition
what every lawyer would say without hesitation, as a matter of everyday
common sense, namely, that the plaintiff was not called as a witness for the
defendant. It is true he could have been, but then, as Prof. Eddington points
out, if I put a saucepan of water on a fire tile water may freeze, although we
may safely affirm that it will boil "because it is too improbable that it should
do anything else". (The Nature of the Physical World, page 76.)
As a matter of fact the plaintiff was not called as a witness by the defendant.
This clearly appears from the brief in the supreme court on behalf of the defendant, the names of the witnesses called by the defendant being given therein.
Can anyone suppose that the court closed its eyes to this admission and decided the case on the hypothesis that the situation may possibly have been
other than it was known to have been in fact?
It is therefore submitted that the opinion in the Kukucz case cannot be
interpreted otherwise than as being contradictory of the scintilla rule.
44 Ohio St. 628, 647 (1855).
5

M'1TZLER, OHIo TRIAL EVIDENCE, p. 119.
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is not here defended. On the contrary, it appears to be unsound.
Nevertheless it has been adhered to until recently (save in one
situation to which reference will shortly be made), and is thoroughly consistent with the scintilla rule.
Under the scintilla rule "wherever there is any evidence, however slight, tending to prove the facts essential to make out a
case for the plaintiff, a non-suit cannot be properly ordered; it is
in no case a question as to the weight, but as to the relevancy of
the testimony".,
Can there be any doubt, then, that there is a
wide departure from the outlook and spirit of that rule in holding
that a party's own evidence may be made the basis of a directed
verdict in his favor? Yet that is exactly what the supreme court
did hold in the Kukucz case. "The missing evidence [that is,
the defendant's evidence] may have fully sustained the trial
court's ruling in directing the verdict."'
Under the scintilla rule, when considering a motion for a
directed verdict, the court can pass only upon the relevancy of
the evidence in the case offered by (or otherwise available to) the
party against whom the motion is directed. He cannot say that,
although relevant, the evidence does not possess sufficient weight
to justify submission to the jury. Yet, under the decision in the
Kukucz case, a trial judge may do the converse, that is, may
determine that a party's evidence (at least when not contradicted
by his opponent's evidence) is not only relevant but possesses
sufficient weight to require a directed verdict in his favor. Now
if the court cannot weigh the evidence of a party against whom a
directed verdict is asked and assay it to determine whether it has
sufficient probative value to submit to the Jury, how can the court
weigh the undisputed evidence of a party in whose favor a directed
verdict is asked and determine whether it has sufficient probative
value to require the court to grant the motion? It is submitted that
it is a logical impossibility.
In this respect, therefore, as in the other already considered,
the scintilla rule and the Kukucz case collide head-on. Both
cannot survive.
Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co., 4 Ohio St.- 628,
647 (18.55); Gibbs v. Village of Girard, 88 Ohio St. 34, 41, 43, 102 N. E 29'
(1913).

7See supra note 3.
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The propriety of directing a verdict in favor of a party on the
basis of his own undisputed evidence, under certain conditions,
would seem to be unquestionable. There is eminent authority
for it. Dean Wigmore, in his great work on Evidence,' says:
"That a verdict may also be directed for the proponent is
accepted by the majority of Courts, though it is more plausibly
open to dispute. The usual situation is that of a plaintiff who has
produced a mass of evidence sufficient to throw upon the defendant the liability of producing some evidence to the contrary,
and if this duty is not sustained, it is the judge's function to make
the decision. The only objection here can be that the judge
must not reach his decision by assuming the plaintiff's testimony
to be true (because that is the jury's province); yet where the
testimony is undisputed, or where in some other way that assumption is unnecessary, this objection disappears. A less common
situation is that of a defendant having an affirmative plea (for
example, payment of a note, or contributory negligence in personal injury): but here also a verdict may be orderedfor the defendant, provided the result can be reached upon undisputed testimony
of the defendant, or upon testimony of the plaintiff, which the latter
must concede to be true." (Italics ours.)
Even in this state it has been held proper if the party's evidence,
which is not contradicted, is exclusively documentary., But it
is clear that there can be no distinction in principle on that basis.
Ordinarily, perhaps, documentary evidence is more trustworthy
than that of witnesses on the stand. But documents may be
forged and altered, while oral testimony in open court is sometimes
convincing beyond the possibility of doubt.
The case of Aetna Life Insurance Company v.

Lembright, 10

decided by the court of appeals for Erie County, is directly in
point, particularly in view of the fact that the supreme court
overruled a motion to certify. That was an action on an employees' group life insurance policy terminable as to each insured
upon the cessation of his employment. It was defended on the
ground that the particular insured had ceased to be employed
prior to his death. To sustain this affirmative defense the
insurer introduced evidence, documentary and otherwise, to
show the cessation of employment. The evidence to this effect
85 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE
9

(2d ed. 1923), p. 461.

Kohl v. Hannaford, 5 Ohio Dec. Rep. 306 (1875).
1032 Ohio App. 10, 166 N. E. 586 (1928).
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was not rebutted by the plaintiff and defendant, therefore, moved
for a directed verdict. This was overruled and the case sent to
the jury, which found for the plaintiff. The court of appeals
held that, since the evidence of the defendant as to the termination of the employment was uncontradicted, it was error to overrule the motion for a directed verdict, and itself entered judgment
for the insurance company. The plaintiff thereupon filed a
motion to certify, which the supreme court overruled on June 19,
1928.
The considerations indicated in the opinion of the supreme
court in French v. Millard" effectively dispose of any contention
that a trial court must direct a verdict in favor of a party whenever his evidence is not contradicted. Trial courts should have
discretion to do so, however, and unless the Kukucz and Lentbright cases are overruled, they do have it now whatever may have
been thought formerly. If they are not overruled, the scintilla
rule has been destroyed.
The scintilla rule should be abandoned. 2 "To rest upon a
formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death."" Nor
should the doctrine of stare decisis call up misgivings. As Chief
Judge Cardozo says, "Hardly a rule of today but may be matched
by its opposite of yesterday.'' 4 Consider the impressive list of
overruled decisions in every jurisdiction. Within the last few
months the United States Supreme Court, in Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota,15 has added further proof that today is
not the helpless slave of yesterday. Our own supreme court,
when the occasion required, has not hesitated to do likewise. 6
There is here no question of vested rights-the court is free to
follow its own judgment.
JOSEPH O'MltARA, JR.
"12 Ohio St. 44 (1853).
I'See the author's note in

2 CIN. L. REV. 450 (1928).

3HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs, 306.
"CARDOZO,

TiE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 26.

1280 U. S. 204 (1930).
"The following are recent instances:

Trucson Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs

Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N. E. 368 (1929); The Commercial Credit
Co. v. Schreyer and Anderson v. Smith, 120 Ohio St. 568, 166 N. E. 808 (1929);
The State, eArrel. Automatic Registering Machine Co. v. Green, 121 Ohio St.
301, 168 N. E. 131 (1929).

